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From my diary
For almost anyone involved in training
junior doctors in the last few months, the
ﬁasco over the Medical Training Applica-
tion System (MTAS) has been terribly
demoralizing. The system failed at so
many levels that it became impossible at
times to keep track of what was going
wrong. For those of you who have found
the whole saga too convoluted or agonis-
ing to follow in detail, here is a highly
selective summary up to summer 2007,
although more awfulness may have fol-
lowed since then.
To start with, total job numbers for
juniors were calculated on the assumption
that most overseas graduates would be
ineligible to apply. A legal muddle of
tragic proportions, probably combined
with poor communication between govern-
ment departments, meant that the exact
regulations remained uncertain when the
system came into operation. Several thou-
sand extra doctors put in applications as a
result. The computerized application form
then turned out to be cumbersome and
inﬂexible, and included some questions
that many regarded as preposterous and
lacking in any validation, while oﬀering
people no chance of recording signiﬁcant
academic achievements. Applicants had to
limit their choice to four stated combina-
tions of speciality-plus-region, and to
prioritise these more or less irrevocably. At
one stage, hackers also managed to gain
access to conﬁdential information. Reports
then started to circulate that excellent can-
didates were failing to get shortlisted for a
single job.
An urgent review took place, followed
by a retrospective change in the rules, lead-
ing to a prodigious number of interviews in
a very short space of time, with literally
tons of paper being transported around
Britain because the electronic systems had
become so untrustworthy. Almost every
consultant in the country can now tell stor-
ies about gifted juniors who have failed to
get into their specialty or region of choice -
or both - or who have been separated from
friends, ﬁance´s or families by the rigidities
of the system. For those of us in general
practice education, it has been little conso-
lation that the national selection system
for GP training programmes used a far
more robust and established approach
than our hospital colleagues did, and the
majority of candidates who put general
practice as their ﬁrst choice have got what
they wanted.
Beyond the speciﬁc mistakes and the
personal miseries, the disaster is a gran-
diloquent metaphor for many of the things
that have been attempted in the health ser-
vice over the last ten years and then gone
horribly and expensively wrong. The
whole scheme began because of a ‘splendid
idea’, indeed a whole package of ‘splendid
ideas’. A national application system, it
was argued, would match job aspirants
against career opportunities, so that young
doctors (or not so young ones) would no
longer ﬂoat around in limbo as staﬀ grades
or perpetual senior house oﬃcers. A coor-
dinated start date would mean that the
best people would get the best jobs, rather
than leaving everything to random timeta-
bling and luck. The application form
would make sure that noone was penalised
for being on the wrong side of the tracks in
terms of their medical school, previous
workplaces, ethnicity, opportunities for
academic development, and so on. As an
added bonus, the scheme would begin
alongside the ﬁnal completion of another
grand and ambitious project: Modernising
Medical Careers. Taken altogether, there
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would be an end to all muddle, uncertainty
and unpredictability as far as junior jobs
were concerned.
The whole idea was magniﬁcent. It was
also systemically illiterate, as many people
tried to warn the organisers in advance.
Complex adaptive systems like job markets
work on evolutionary principles. They
depend on continuous feedback loops, on
self-regulating calibrations, and on the
passage of time. They are inhabited by
choice, by chance, and by chaos. From a
manager’s point of view it may look
awfully messy if Dr Faith Hopeful applies
for three registrar jobs in cardiology in
London over the course of six months and
then settles for a dermatology rotation in
north Wales. From the point of view of a
systems theorist, a social psychologist or
the average intelligent citizen, it looks like
quite a sensible way of sorting matters out.
More important, it will probably be much
easier for Dr Hopeful to adjust to her
altered trajectory, and to accept the vicissi-
tudes of fate and competition, if she has
had time to digest the experience and learn
from it. It may of course be possible for
managers to make focussed and gradual
interventions in order to alter single
aspects of such a system (for example,
gender bias against women entering cardi-
ology). However, there is a huge amount
of theory, research, historical evidence and
common wisdom to support the idea that
massive, centralised, protocol-driven
attempts to render such systems entirely
rational and manageable are generally
futile and often destructive.
The destructive eﬀects of so-called
‘rational’ policy-making have been bril-
liantly exposed by Jake Chapman in his
book System Failure: why governments
must learn to think diﬀerently.1 Chapman
shows how centralised initiatives in the
public sector are always likely to fail
because of unintended consequences, alie-
nation of professionals involved in deliv-
ery, and long-term failure to improve over-
all system performance. He argues that
systems thinking oﬀers an alternative route
to developing solutions and increasing per-
formance, especially when dealing with
‘messes’. He recommends changes based
on learning processes, rather than specify-
ing outcomes or targets. He advocates an
increased tolerance of failure, continuous
feedback on eﬀectiveness and a willingness
to foster diversity and innovation. Chap-
man proposes that the aim of any interven-
tion should be to provide a minimum speci-
ﬁcation, creating an environment in which
innovative, complex behaviours can
emerge, and based more upon listening
and co-researching rather than telling and
instructing. A key part of any evaluation
and reﬂection process, he argues, should
be ‘the selection of successful approaches
and, equally importantly, the demise of
those that have not succeeded.’ Let us
hope that the demise, if nothing else, hap-
pens in relation to MTAS.
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